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HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL
Morris Greenspan*
INTRODUCTION
Since the June War of 1967, there has been no lack of attempts
by the Arab states and their supporters to impugn Israel's regard for
and recognition of human rights in the territories which she occupied
during that conflict. This has been particularly the case in the forum
of the United Nations, where the Arab states constitute a formidable
bloc of nearly a score of states. Together with the states linked to
them by religion, interest, and policy, the Arab states are well able
to conduct a running campaign of political warfare in the form of
resolutions condemnatory of Israel's administration of the occupied
territories. Almost invariably such resolutions are passed-even
though a majority of member states habitually take no part in the
condemnation, a few oppose it, and the rest abstain or absent them-
selves. Such is the power of bloc politics in the United Nations.
The influence of the Arab states and their supporters in the
United Nations has resulted in the creation of two United Nations
bodies to investigate complaints of infringement of human rights by
the Israel government in the occupied territories. Both of these bodies
have issued reports critical of Israel,' and it is mainly on the basis
of these reports that the author proposes to examine the real status
of human rights in these occupied territories. While this may seem
to be a rather negative approach to the question, it has this advan-
tage: since these reports embody every accusation that the Arabs
believed they could bring against Israel for infringement of human
rights, the areas of controversy are defined; and it can be fairly
assumed that, in matters in which no charges have been made,
Israel's conduct of the occupation is not open to serious criticism.
This paper will consider, first, what validity, if any, should be
attached to the criticisms in the reports by the United Nations in-
vestigatory bodies; secondly, the occupation itself will be viewed
more positively, from a first-hand account, to provide a more balanced
assessment of the actual situation.
* LL.B., Leeds University (England); Barrister-at-Law of Gray's Inn, London;
author of T~m MODER LAW OF LAwD WARARE (1959) and THx SOLDIER'S GUIMP TO
THE LAws OF WAR (1969).
1 See notes 20-22 and accompanying text, infra.
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NATURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS INVESTIGATORY BODIES
The First Investigatory Body
Authority to establish the first U.N. investigatory body was
contained in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2443
(XXIII) of December 19, 1968.2 However, this body, the Special
Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human
Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, was actually
constituted under dubious legal circumstances. The resolution author-
ized the President of the Twenty-Third Session of the General
Assembly to appoint the members of the committee. The President
died without being able to induce uncommitted states to serve.
Finally, at the instance of U Thant, the United Nations Secretary-
General, the appointments were made by one of the vice presidents
of the twenty-third session, although the vice president no longer
held office after the expiration of the session.
The representative of Israel protested the lack of legal authority
for such a proceeding, but to no avail.3 Rather incredibly, the follow-
ing three states were constituted as the committee: Ceylon, Somalia,
and Yugoslavia.4 All three states are rabidly pro-Arab; none has
diplomatic relations with Israel; and, Somalia actually considers itself
in a state of war with Israel.' Israel's justified lack of confidence in
the impartiality of the committee was further exacerbated by the
terms of the General Assembly resolution under which the committee
was "appointed." ' The wording of the resolution had the clear effect
of prejudging adversely against Israel the very matters the committee
was set up to investigate. 7
This unfortunate situation was compounded in a subsequent
General Assembly resolution passed shortly after the committee was
constituted.' This resolution not only "condemned" various "policies
2 G.A. Res. 2443, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18 at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969). See
also Report of Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human
Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, 25 U.N. GAOR, Agenda Item
No. 101, Annex I, at 61, U.N. Doc. A/8089 (1971). (Of states voting, 60 were for,
22 against, 37 abstained.)
3 U.N. Doc. A/7495/Add. 1 (1969).
4 U.N. Doc. A/7495/Add. 3 (1969). H. S. Amerasinghe (Ceylon), Chairman.
5 U.N. Does. A/7984*-86* (1970).
6 The preamble of the resolution cites the terms of resolutions of various bodies
where Arab influence had succeeded in condemning Israel for violations of human
rights in the occupied territories. G.A. Res. 2443, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18 at 50,
U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969).
7 See note verbale, 6 January 1970, from the Permanent Representative of Israel
at U.N., Report of Special Committee, supra note 2, at 5.
8 GA. Res. 2546, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30 at 54, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969). (52
states for, 13 against, 49 abstained.)
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and practices" attributed to Israel in the occupied territories, but
also told the committee "to take cognizance of the provisions" of the
resolution. This could only mean that the General Assembly itself
foreclosed an impartial investigation by the committee.
It is noteworthy that about a year after the committee came into
being, the Secretary-General of the United Nations issued a report,
Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict,9 in which he suggests
that the General Assembly and Human Rights Commission cease
creating ad hoc bodies, such as the committee under discussion and
the subsequently formed second investigatory body. The Secretary-
General cautioned that such bodies "might be viewed as somewhat
precarious and liable to inspire a lesser degree of confidence" and
suggested instead the creation of a standing "agency of implementa-
tion" under United Nations aegis. He went on to use words peculiarly
applicable to the present situation, namely: "An absolute prerequi-
site for the establishment and success of such an agency would be
that its character would be exclusively and strictly humanitarian; it
would have to be scrupulously non-political and it should strive to
offer all guarantees of impartiality, efficiency and rectitude."' 0
In a similar vein are the following words of the U.N. Economic
and Social Council, the parent body of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights which created the second investigatory body, the
Special Working Group of Experts. The Council stated: "the com-
position of any body responsible for making such inquiries [into
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms] and its pro-
cedures must be such as to provide a reliable guarantee of its compe-
tence and impartiality."' "
Under these circumstances, it was quite understandable that
Israel would protest the appointment of a committee "whose com-
position automatically guaranteed its anti-Israel bias,"'" and the
manner in which it had been constituted, would denounce it as "a
worthless exercise . . .a vehicle for propaganda and political war-
fare,"'" and would refuse cooperation with the committee.
9 Report of the Secretary General, 25 U.N. GAOR, Agenda Item 47, U.N. Doc.
A/8052 (1970).
10 Id. at 77.
11 Report of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 3,
at 49, U.N. Doc. A/8003 (1970).
12 Report of Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting -the
Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, 25 U.N. GAOR, Agenda
Item No. 101, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/8089 (1971). [Hereinafter cited as Report of the
Special Committee I].
13 Id.
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The Second Investigatory Body
The second investigatory body was set up by the United Na-
tions Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 6 (XXV) of
March 4, 1969.1 The mandate of the Special Working Group of Ex-
perts was "to investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War of 12 August 1949, in the territories occupied by
Israel as a result of hostilities in the Middle East."' 5
Once again, it was a resolution adopted by a minority of states,
consisting of Arab states and their supporters.' Even more signifi-
cantly, the resolution, while referring to "allegations" against Israel
in its mandate, in fact foreclosed impartial investigation by finding
Israel guilty, in the operative part of the resolution, of the very al-
legations the group was asked to investigate. Thus, as in the case of
the Special Committee, the resolution prejudged the issues. Further-
more, the composition of the group could hardly be termed neutral.
Of the six individuals appointed, one (from Peru) took no part in
the hearings. A Yugoslavian was vice chairman, and the most active
member was from India.'7 Of the rest, the chairman was from Sene-
gal, the others from Tanzania and Austria.
Israel protested the establishment of the group, indicating it
would be better advised to have "regard for the vicious trampling on
the human rights of the Jewish Communities in certain Arab coun-
tries in the Middle East Region,"'" and refused cooperation for what
it later described, in regard to both investigatory bodies, as their
"illegal constitution, biased terms of reference, and incompetence."' 9
THE "EVIDENCE" PRESENTED AGAINST ISRAEL
Both investigatory bodies held meetings in the Arab countries
bordering on Israel and in Geneva and New York, but not in Israel
'4 Report of the Special Working Group of Experts, U.N. Economic and Social
Council, Commission on Human Rights, 26th Session, Item 5 of the provisional agenda,
at 2-4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1016 (1970). The entire report consists of U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1016 and Adds. 1-5 (1970). [Hereinafter referred to as Report of the Special
Working Group with citation to appropriate document].
15 1d.
18 Id. at 6. (13 for, 1 against, 16 abstaining, 2 absent.)
17 Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1016/Add. 4, at 1-2 (1970).
18 Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1016,
at 6 (1970).
19 Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting theHuman Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, 26 U.N. GAOR, Agenda
Item No. 40, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/8389 and Corr. 1 and 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Report of the Special Committee II].
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or the occupied territories. The bodies received both oral and docu-
mentary evidence. Although the mandate of the Special Committee
was wider than that of the Special Working Group, the former heard
much the same evidence and covered the same ground as the latter.
It was, therefore, essentially a duplication of effort. The Special
Working Group issued its report first, on February 11, 1970; 20 the
Special Committee followed with a report on October 5, 1970,21 and,
after further hearings, with a supplementary report on September 17,
1971.22
The report-at any rate, its conclusions and recommendations
-of the Special Working Group is rather more restrained and ob-
jective than are the reports of the Special Committee, but only com-
paratively so. It admits that "The evidence received by the Group
was one-sided. 23 And while stating the opinion that "there are vio-
lations of the Fourth Geneva Convention," the report concedes that
the group "was not in a position to verify these allegations juri-
dically. ' 24 Even so, the body of the report contains a mass of lurid
detail regarding purported violations that can only be characterized
as raw, unevaluated material from extremely partisan sources. 25 It
was on this "evidence" that the Group arrived at its conclusions.
An example of the quality and worth of the evidence offered is
found in the first case cited under the heading, "Torture and ill-
treatment of individuals, other than detainees."'26 The case relates to
one Mohammed Kader Derbas, who "testified that he had been cas-
trated in Gaza .... The witness also stated that several other men
had been castrated who were unwilling to testify before the Working
Group."27
The Special Committee also thought the case of Derbas worthy
of presentation in its report under Chapter III, "Analysis of Evi-
dence." Dealing with "Ill-treatment of prisoners and detainees," the
"analysis" goes into further detail in this case.28 Here it is stated
that Derbas was arrested in Gaza by the Israelis during the June
20 Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1016/
Add. 2 (1970) (Conclusions and Recommendations).
21 Report of the Special Committee I.
22 Report of the Special Committee II. The Special Committee has also issued a
further supplementary report, A/8389/Add. 1 and Corr. 1 and 2 (1971), in which (at
p. 18) suggests disbandment of the Special Committee.
23 Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1016/
Add. 2, at 2 (1970).
24 Id. at 2-3.
25 Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 14, E/CN.4/1016/Add. 1,
Chap. III, at 13f (1970).
26 Id. at 20.
27 id.
28 Report of the Special Committee I, at 42.
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war, but was castrated in Atlit Prison, which is in Israel. To add em-phasis to this testimony, the report continues: "When he recovered
from the effects of the anaesthetic, his attention was drawn to the
organs that had been removed from him in the course of the opera-
tion and which were displayed in front of his bed." To further
authenticate the account, the report states: "This case is mentioned
because witness Derbas was examined at the instance of the Special
Working Group of Experts when they visited Cairo."
The fact is that the archives of the Gaza Health Department
contain two documents, one of which, dated June 14, 1966 (a year
before the June war of 1967), gives testimony that Derbas' testicles
were removed at the "Nasser Hospital," Khan Yunis (Gaza Strip),
because of tubercular infection. The other, dated July 28, 1966, is
from the files of the Medical Faculty of Cairo University, where
Derbas came in the vain hope of "an implantation of testicles."29
The tendentious nature of the reports of the Special Committee
is further illustrated by the treatment of the Derbas case in the
second report (A/8389), which the Special Committee issued in
September, 1971. Obviously embarrassed by the revelations of the
Israeli government before the Third Committee and the Special
Political Committee of the United Nations regarding this case, the
Special Committee attempted to cover its confusion by addressing a
letter to Israel requesting the evidence in its possession, well know-
ing the Israeli policy of non-cooperation with the committee." ° The
committee also addressed a letter to the United Arab Republic re-
questing the medical reports in its possession and also the where-
abouts of Professor Mohammed Sa Fawat,81 who signed the medical
report of July 28, 1966, in Cairo. 2
Note the committee's manner of disposing of the Derbas case
in its "Analysis of Evidence" in the second report: "The Govern-
ment of Israel has not so far furnished to the Special Committee the
information in rebuttal it claimed to possess, nor has the Special
Committee been able to trace the whereabouts of Professor Moham-
med Sa Fawat."88 A question which deserves answer is why the
committee fails to publish the reply of the Egyptian government, as
29 Photocopies of the two documents are contained in G. WEIGERT, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES 12-13 (n.d.) [hereinafter cited asG. WEIGERT]. Weigert, an Israeli journalist who specializes in Arab affairs, appeared
before the Special Committee to testify to improved conditions in the occupied 'ter-
ritories as a result of the occupation. See, Report of the Special Committee I, at 52.80 Report of the Special Committee II, at 10. See also at 49.
31 Gideon Weigert gives the name as "Sawfat." See note 29, supra.
32 Report of the Special Committee II, at 12.
33 Id. at 24.
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it published the replies of all other governments to which it addressed
letters. Is the committee covering for the Egyptian government,
which, it is claimed, cannot trace the whereabouts of a presumably
well-known Egyptian medical specialist and for its failure to produce
documents from its medical archives?
It certainly cannot be said that either of the Special Com-
mittee's reports are honestly compiled, accurate documents, although
the committee is more cautious in its second report in charging ill-
treatment of persons under detention by Israel. While the first report
called on Israel "To cease immediately, and to prevent," such prac-
tices, 4 the second report, while still publicizing unproven allegations
in its "Findings," was sufficiently deterred by the revelations in the
Derbas case and others to state: "Numerous allegations of ill-treat-
ment while under detention have been made before the Special Com-
mittee. In the absence of sufficient corroborative evidence, the
Special Committee is unable to reach a conclusive finding in regard
to these cases."8"
Another example of the committee's lack of candor and of its
bias and tendentiousness against Israel in regard to allegations of
ill-treatment is its commendation of the evidence of one Nadim
Zerou, a former mayor of Ramallah in the West Bank. The com-
mittee stated that Zerou's evidence "deserves special attention . . .
[it] satisfies these tests [norms of credibility] and deserves cre-
dence," 6 although the "evidence" was untrue in a material particular
which the committee somehow managed to omit from the report.87
Concerning the testimony of another witness, Ahmed Khalifa,
the committee said that the evidence "was particularly impressive,
because . . . he did not give the impression that he was moved by
rancor towards his former captors. Despite his experiences, he
seemed to have retained his objectivity and sense of proportion.""8
Assessment of the witness' objectivity would have been enhanced by
mention of the fact that this witness "long before his detention, was,
by his own admission, a political officer in George Habash's Libera-
34 Report of the Special Committee I, at 56.
35 Report of the Special Committee II, at 55. In the further supplementary re-
port, A/8389/Add. 1 and Corr. 1 and 2 (1971), the Special Committee admits that
another allegation of torture injury was in fact "hysterical or feigned paralysis" (at
pp. 12-13).
a6 Report of the Special Committee I, at 33-34.
37 He stated that two Israeli soldiers who had wrongfully shot dead two Arabs
had not been punished, when in fact the District Court of Jerusalem had sentenced
both of them to life imprisonment. ISRAEL MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ISRAEL IN
TiRE ADmNISTERED AREAS 14-15 (n.d.) [hereinafter cited as Israel Policy Statements].
See also G. WEIGERT, supra note 29, at 38-39.
88 Report of the Special Committee I, at 33.
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tion Front, one of the most extreme terrorist organizations."39 This,
too, the committee carefully omitted from its report.
On an overall view, it becomes apparent that the allegations of
violations of human rights contained in the various reports have the
political purpose of influencing world opinion to force evacuation by
Israel of the occupied territories, without a peace treaty and other
guarantees that Israel would need to ensure its continued existence.
This purpose is made explicit in the reports of the Special Committee.
In its recommendations in its first report, the Special Committee
states:
[I]n order to spare the civilian population and the prisoners of war
in the area of conflict in the Middle East further suffering, the weight
of international public opinion should be brought to bear on the Gov-
ernment of Israel to apply forthwith the principles declared in Security
Council resolution 242 (1967),40 and in conformity with that resolu-
tion to withdraw Israeli armed forces from the occupied territories and
to bring the occupation to an end. 41
Note carefully that the committee adds the word the before
"occupied territories" in citing resolution 242, when in fact that word
was intentionally omitted from the resolution. 42 The significance of
this fact is that the omission indicates that Israel was not required
under resolution 242 to withdraw from all the occupied territories,
and this interpretation is supported by the second principle of the
resolution, which affirms the right of every state in the area to
"secure and recognized boundaries," which right Israel certainly did
not enjoy in June, 1967. The Arab states and their supporters have
always insisted on inserting "the" at this point in citing the resolu-
tion, and the Special Committee demonstrates its bias by following
their lead.
In its second report, the Special Committee disclaims interfer-
ence in political matters-as distinct from humanitarian issues43-
but then in its findings, deals with the very matters that can only
be the subject of political settlement. These are resolved in favor
of the Arabs. 4
Thus, it is clear that the "evidence" gathered by the investigatory
bodies and the conclusions, findings, and recommendations of these
bodies must be treated with considerable reserve, to say the least.
Still, since these bodies have made allegations accusing Israel of
39 Israel Policy Statements, supra note 37, at 18.
40 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 482 (1968).
41 Report of the Special Committee I, at 55 (emphasis added).42 Rostow, Legal Aspects of the Search for Peace, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. No. 4, at
69 (Sept. 1970) (Proceedings of the American Society of International Law).43 Report of the Special Committee II, at 3, 56, 59.44 Id. at 57 (para. 83).
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violations of human rights in various respects, it is necessary to
consider whether those complaints have any substance.
NATURE OF THE ALLEGATIONS
One of the main accusations against Israel concerns ill-treatment
and torture of prisoners and detainees. Certainly, treatment of this
kind would offend against human rights.45 But there is no basis in
fact for accusing the Israeli government of a policy of ill-treatment,
and the Special Committee ruled in its second report that such allega-
tions were not proven 5a The government has severely punished those
of its troops who have been guilty of crimes against the Arab popula-
tion.46 In general, the various allegations against Israel can be
summed up in the words of the correspondent of a leading English
newspaper:
[V]irtually every Arab one meets alleges that prisoners are tortured in
the interrogation centres .... Personally, I came up with no conclusive
evidence. The Arab preference for allegation to evidence does not help
the investigator. When I asked the Mayor of Nablus and his colleagues
to substantiate their charges by taking me to talk to any young Arab
of the town who had been tortured, they reverted to Arabic and then
insisted that it was the occupation, not its manifestations, which was
intolerable. No doubt the Arabs are partly governed by their own
imaginations . . .4
It is instructive to note that rather than trust themselves to the
mercies of the Jordanian authorities, who have so vigorously de-
nounced Israeli treatment of Arab prisoners, in July, 1971, about
100 Arab terrorists waded the Jordan River and surrendered them-
selves to the Israelis, who were supposedly their real enemies.4" The
45 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, 3 U.N. GAOR pt. I at 71,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) adopted and proclaimed by GA. Res. 217A. See also Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Geneva Convention IV (Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War), 75 U.N.T.S. No. 973, at 287
(1949) (arts. 27, 31-32).
45a Report of the Special Committee II, at 55.
46 See note 37, supra. See also Statement by Israel Ambassador Mordecai Kidron
on Agenda Item No. 5 of the 27th Sess. of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
Geneva, March 12, 1971.
47 Caute in The Guardian (London), April 26, 1970, cited in ISRAEL MNISTRY
FOR FOREIGN A.YFAIs, EYE-WITNESS REPORTS ON THE ISRAEL MILITARY ADMINISTRATION
FROM THE FOREIGN PRESS (Israel Information Series 1970) ; cf. Pryce-Jones, The Sun-
day Telegraph (London), Dec. 21, 1969, cited in G. WEIGERT, supra note 29, at 24-25.
Captured terrorists appear quite willing to talk without coercion: "Captured Ter-
rorists willingly led interrogators to their colleagues. The investigators, who were
amazed how easily prisoners turned in their friends, used to joke that there must be
ways to prevent a prisoner from talking." E. YAARI, STRIKE TERROR: THE STORY OF
FATAH 143 (1970).
48 Tim, Aug. 2, 1971, at 23.
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author personally saw one of these men on July 25, 1971, in thehospital at Ramleh Prison, where he was being treated for a gunshot
wound in a leg inflicted by the Jordanians.4"
As for the behavior of Israeli troops in the occupied areas, in
spite of various allegations of looting before both investigatorybodies, even the Special Committee was forced to conclude: "The
evidence before the Special Committee, however, does not justify
the conclusion that it was the practice of the occupying Power to loot
and pillage the occupied territories."'50 The standard of behavior ofIsraeli forces in regard to the population can be measured by the
criterion that only one woman came forward before either investigat-
ing body to claim that she had been raped, and the woman in ques-
tion told a story that was hardly credible. " The intensive efforts of
all those attempting to impugn the Israeli forces, turned up this single
allegation, which suggests that the behavior of the Israeli forces is
unique in the history of warfare. Troops with a standard of behavior
as high as this are not likely to commit atrocities; moreover, disci-pline of this caliber manifests the policy of the Israel government
not to allow atrocities to occur.
Another accusation against Israel, particularly made by the
Special Working Group of Experts, relates to administrative deten-
tions of persons in the occupied areas. The Special Working Group
alleges in its conclusions that "the vast majority of detainees areheld in virtue of administrative orders. It also appears that persons
under administrative detention are deprived of any guarantee con-
cerning the length of detention and fair trial.) 52
In its recommendations, the group stated: "5. Matters concern-
ing the detention of civilians, in particular administrative detention,
require special attention, as well as the extent to which the treatment
of such detainees conforms to the provisions of the Convention, in
particular section IV of Part III of the Convention."53
The Special Committee's own report on this matter contradicts
the statements of the Special Working Group. It states: "According
to a report appearing in the Jerusalem Post on 15 July 1971, DefenseMinister Moshe Dayan informed the Knesset that in May 1970 the
number of administrative detainees was 1,131 and that in June 1971
the number had decreased to 560. Of these, 229 came from the West
Bank, 303 from the Gaza Strip, 14 from Jerusalem and 14 from
40 My visit to the prison is described more fully later.
5o Report of the Special Committee I, at 51.51 Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1016/
Add. 1, at 20 (1970).
52 Id., E/CN.4/1016/Add. 2, at 3 (1970).
53 Id. at 5.
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Israel."54 In November 1971, the Israeli Police Minister informed
the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) that 3,631 terrorists were currently
serving terms in prisons under Israeli jurisdiction.55 It will, therefore,
be seen that the majority of those detained for security reasons are
not held "in virtue of administrative orders."
As for the conditions under which detainees are held, the dele-
gates of the International Committee of the Red Cross have access
to the detainees and are thus able to verify whether their treatment
conforms with Section IV of Part III of Geneva Convention IV of
1949. Humane treatment of detainees has been described by indepen-
dent observers.56
Administrative detention of persons in occupied territory is, in
fact, authorized by Article 78 of Geneva Convention IV, 1949, which
states: "If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for impera-
tive reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected
persons,57 it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or
to internment."
The article further provides:
Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall be
made according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupy-
ing Power in accordance with the provisions of the present Conven-
tion. This procedure shall include the right of appeal for the parties
concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay. In
the event of the decision being upheld, it shall be subject to periodical
review, if possible every six months, by a competent body set up by
the said Power.58
The Israeli military administration in the occupied areas has
translated these provisions into practice in Section 67 of the Order
Concerning Security Instructions applicable to those areas, as fol-
lows: The only purpose of the detention is to prevent sabotage and
subversive activities. The detainee is held for a definite period in a
place of detention fixed by the Regional Military Commander, as far
as possible separate from other types of prisoners. Notice of his
rights is posted for his perusal, and these include rights to visits,
mail, receipt of parcels, and medical treatment. Issue of a detention
54 Report of the Special Committee II, at 51.
55 The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 16, 1971, at 7, col. 3 (Weekly Overseas Edition).
56 See Dershowitz, Terrorism & Preventive Detention: The Case of Israel, 50
COM-MENTARY No. 6, at 68 (Dec. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz].
57 "Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and
in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals."
Geneva Convention IV (Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War), 75 U.N.T.S. No. 973, at art. 4 (1949).
58 Id. at art. 78.
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order must be immediately reported to the Legal Adviser of the
subdistrict and the order is delivered to the detainee himself. He is
also advised that he may appeal the order to an appeal committee,
headed by a judge, which is set up for each region. He is heard in
person and may be represented by counsel. The committee, of its
own motion, reviews the detention every six months.5"
It may be noted that practically every state has recourse to
administrative detentions in time of national emergency and war.
Recent examples of its use by democratic countries include Canada,
in Quebec in 1970, against French-Canadian terrorists and Britain,
in Northern Ireland, against Irish dissidents in 1971. In May, 1971,
the authorities in Washington, D.C., used a form of administrative
arrest to neutralize protests against the war in Vietnam which
threatened to tie up the capital.6 °
In World War II, 109,650 men, women, and children of Japan-
ese descent on the west coast of America were detained in camps; 1
Britain used administrative detention both at home and abroad in
that war and has used it subsequently; France has done the same.
The dictatorships, Communist and Fascist, have, of course, used it
incessantly, in war and in peace. For the members of the two in-
vestigatory bodies to accuse Israel in this connection is merely
ridiculous, particularly in view of the conduct of Arab countries such
as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, which swept up Jews into prison at the
time of the June war and subsequently, merely for being Jews,
detained them for long periods and often horribly maltreated them.62
59 LAW FACULTY OF THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE RE-SEARCH AND COMPARATIVE LAW, LAW AND THE COURTS IN THE ISRAEL-HELD AREAS in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE A AB-IsRAEL CONFLICT: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, ARTICLES AND
OTHER MATERIALS 276-77 (A. Shapira ed. 1971). See also, Hadar, Administrative De-
tentions Employed by Israel, in 1 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 287-89 (1971);
Shapiro-Libai at Id. 427-28 (where the provision is given as Article 87, Security Pro-
visions Order).
60 TIME, May 17, 1971, at 13-15.
61 Dershowitz, at 72.
62 For some recent reports of the plight of Jews in these countries, see, The
Jerusalem Post, Jan. 4, 1972, at 11 (Weekly Overseas Ed.). See also The Jerusalem
Post, Dec. 28, 1971, at 3, cols. 1, 2 (Weekly Overseas Ed.) which states inter alia,
regarding Syria: "Other eyewitnesses say that 40 Damascus men, women and children
were recently interrogated in the Jewish Quarter's military intelligence department.
One youth was tortured on the rack: other people have been burned with cigarettes:
and a 16-year old girl was raped by a policeman. The act was repeated in front of
her father and brother who came to inquire about her." The Jerusalem Post, No-
vember 16, 1971, at 4, cols. 1, 2 (Weekly Overseas Ed.) states: "One Jewish girl was
brought into a police station where she was raped, and later officers extinguished their
cigarettes against her body. 'Afterwards, they hurled her into the street in Damascus'
Jews Quarter, so that the Jews there might see . . . .'" The paper also describes mis-
treatment of Jews arrested in Egypt in 1954 and finally released after the June war,1967, id. at 2. 17 KEESiNG'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 23231A-23232 (1969-70), de-
scribes hangings and reports torture of Jews in Iraq. See also H. H. Cohn, Discrimi-
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The Special Committee in its first report also complained of a
policy of "collective and area punishment" in certain of the occupied
areas. 3 Certainly collective penalties inflicted on innocent persons
for the acts of others are forbidden both by Article 50 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907," and Article 33, Geneva Convention IV, 1949.61
However, a distinction must be made between collective penalties and
measures taken to ensure both public security in the occupied terri-
tory and the security of the occupying power and its forces. This is
laid down in Article 64 of Geneva Convention IV, 1949, which states:
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the
occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Oc-
cupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention,
to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the
security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of
the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establish-
ments and lines of communication used by them.66
Measures such as curfews necessitated by the situation are
perfectly permissible, even though they affect innocent persons, and
are, in fact, a standard measure of control of the population under
circumstances of tension and public disorder. In such circumstances,
they cannot be regarded as collective penalties. The question of
demolition of houses will be discussed shortly, but it can be stated
here that the measures taken by the Israeli authorities in the in-
stances cited by the Special Committee appear to be consistent with
Article 64.
The matter of demolition of houses that have been used to
shelter and aid terrorists has in fact been the subject of a good deal
of controversy, and the two investigatory bodies have featured it in
their reports. The Special Working Group has denounced"8 such
actions as reprisals illegal under Article 33 of Geneva Convention IV,
1949, which states: "Reprisals against protected persons and their
property are prohibited." The Special Committee in its second report
claims that not only do such actions offend against Article 33, but
ination of Jewish Minorities in Arab Countries, in 1 IsRAEL YEAnOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 127-133 (1971).
63 Report of the Special Committee I, at 29.
64 HAGUE CONVENTION IV, REGULATIONS RESPECTINo THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
WAR ON LAND, 36 Stat. 2307, T.S. No. 539 at art. 50 (1907).
05 Geneva Convention IV (Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War) 75 U.N.T.S. No. 973, at art. 33 (1949) [hereinafter referred to as Geneva
Convention IV].
66 Id. at art. 64.
67 Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 14, E/CN.4/1016/Add. 1, at
61-62 (1970); Report of the Special Committee II, at 44-46.
68 Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 14, E/CN.4/1016/Add. 1, at
61-62 (1970).
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also against Article 53 of the same convention, which will be dis-
cussed shortly.
Much of the controversy regarding these demolitions has cen-
tered on the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945, which were
enacted by the British Mandatory Government then ruling what
was known as Palestine. Both Israel and the portions of Palestine
that came under Arab rule after the 1948 partition and war (the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip) inherited this law. It is contended
by Israel that this law remained in effect in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip at the time of the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation
of those areas."9 The Jordanian government, however, has denied
that this law was in force in the West Bank at the time of the 1967
occupation.7 °
If the contention of Israel is correct, the law would have formed
part of the penal law of the occupied territory. An occupant has the
general duty of enforcing that law,71 except "in cases where they
constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application
of the present Convention. 7
Regulation 119 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945
provides for "forfeiture and destruction of a building from which
shots are fired, or which has been used for a security offence (that
is, an offence triable in military courts) .,,7 The Special Committee,
however, contends that the regulations as a whole are invalid as not
being in conformity with Geneva Convention IV.74
In fact, it is not necessary to consider the propriety of the
Israeli government actions on the basis of the emergency regulations,
if reference is made to the very article cited by the Special Com-
mittee, that is, Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV, 1949. It forbids
the occupying power to destroy property, real or personal, "except
where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations. ' ' 75
69 Report of the Special Committee I, at 88. See also J. STONE, No PEACE-No
WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 14 (1969).
70 Report of the Special Committee I, at 88-89. However, Jordan claims to have
nullified the law by legislation in May, 1948, when Jordan had no legislative authority
over the West Bank. Id. at 88 (paras. 1-2).
71 HAGUE CONvENTION IV, REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
WAR ON LAND, 36 Stat. 2306, T.S. No. 539 at art. 43 (1907); Geneva Convention IV,
at art. 64.
72 Geneva Convention IV, at art 64; HAGUE CONVENTION IV, REGULATIONS RE-
SPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND, 36 Stat. 2306, T.S. No. 539 at
art. 43 (1907) says "respecting . . . unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in
the country."
73 J. STONE, No PEACE-No WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 14 (1969).
74 Report of the Special Committee I, at 23-25.
75 Geneva Convention IV, at art. 53.
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Demolitions have been carried out by the Israeli authorities only
as necessary to counteract terrorist activity in the occupied areas.
It is a tenet of counterguerrilla action that the base from which the
guerrilla operates must be destroyed, because only if he has a base
can he operate. This precept of military action against guerrillas has
been carried out in all places and times, most recently by the British
in Malaya and Kenya, the French in Algeria, and the United States
in Vietnam. All these countries resettled villagers from guerrilla-
infested areas and demolished the villages which gave the guerrillas
shelter. Israeli action in this respect has been miniscule compared
with other nations; even the Special Committee could recite only
109 houses demolished in the period May, 1970, to April, 1971.76 All
inhabitants are, of course, removed before the houses are destroyed.
The Israeli action is, therefore, justifiable under Article 53.
The investigatory bodies also heard allegations of the wrongful
destruction of villages. Here, again, it is evident that there is a great
deal of exaggeration7" and that destruction in the course of military
operations or necessitated by considerations of military security has
been charged as illegal. In fact, the Special Working Group notes:
"The largest number of allegations concerning violations of the
Geneva Convention relate mostly to the period immediately following
the hostilities of June 1967."'7  Regarding these allegations, the
group avoided any definite conclusion, stating only: "The Group
was not in a position to state whether the destruction of these villages
was absolutely justified by military operations, in accordance with
article 53 of the Convention. '
79
In spite of the fact that the Special Committee was not able to
allege much more than 200 houses demolished since November 1,
1969, ° it claimed that this was part of an Israeli policy to force
the Arab inhabitants from their homes, with a view to annexation of
the territory."' In the same paragraph, the committee indicates that
at least some of the householders were relocated in the area, which
76 Report of the Special Committee II, at 44 (para. 54). The figures for this
period were taken from Israeli newspapers. Otherwise, the number of houses demol-
ished has often been exaggerated by Arab and other sources; for instance, in October
1969, 18 houses were demolished in Halhul village, near Hebron, but a British jour-
nalist reported 85 houses destroyed and Arab newspapers in Amman reported 200. A
gang of terrorists operated from the village. See G. WEIGERT, supra note 29, at 17-18.
77 An Israeli soldier and writer who objected to some demolition during the war,
describes how his words were exaggerated and distorted in the foreign press. A.
ECKARDT & R. ECKARDT, ENCOUNTER WITH ISR.AEL 195 (1970).
78 Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 14, E/CN.4/1016/Add. 2, at
2 (1970).
79 Id. at 3.
80 Report of the Special Committee II, at 44-45.
81 Id. at 54 (para. 75).
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gives cause to wonder at this claim as well. About a million Arabs
live in the occupied areas. 82
The same purported Israeli policy is alleged by the committee
in the deportation of civilians from the occupied territory.83 Here,
again, there is exaggeration and distortion of events. The Special
Committee stated that it "has no doubt that a large number of per-
sons have been forcibly deported regularly from the occupied terri-
tories by the Israeli authorities ... this is part of the Government of
Israel's policy." 84
Ironically, two items in the committee's own reports belie this
statement. First, the procedure laid down for deportation, as stated
in the report,85 is not designed for indiscriminate deportation; second,
a source most unsympathetic to the government of Israel, which is
cited in an annex to the first report, can list in the period September
6, 1968 to March 19, 1970, a total of only 86 persons, a "family,"
and a "whole Bedouin tribe" deported to Jordan and six persons
deported to Sinai.86
The expulsion of the "whole Bedouin tribe" is listed under the
date of May 21, 1969, but the Special Working Group seems to have
missed this item in its own report, although it would seem improb-
able that the group would overlook the deportation of a "whole
tribe." Another source lists only twenty-three deportations from "the
beginning of the occupation to December 1968," of which one was
readmitted.87 Such numbers hardly amount to a policy of depopulat-
ing the occupied areas, as is alleged by the Special Committee.
The same Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945, which have
been referred to earlier, in Regulation 112 "authorizes deportations
on grounds of certain activities against security." 8 Even if these
regulations were part of the pre-existing law of the occupied terri-
tories, however, it appears that they were overruled by Article 49
of Geneva Convention IV, 1949, which forbids deportations of pro-
tected persons from occupied territory to territory outside. Neverthe-
less, it should be noted that the purpose of Article 49 was to guard
against deportations to death and slave labor camps which the Nazis
82 ISRAEL MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FACTS ABOUT ISRAEL 1971, at 170.
83 Report of the Special Committee I, at 31-32; Report of the Special Committee
II, at 42-43. See also, Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 14, E/CN.4/
1016/Add. 1, at 62-75 (1970).
84 Report of the Special Committee II, at 42.
85 Id. at 43.
86 Report of the Special Committee I, at 110-11.
87 J. STONE, No PEAcE--No WAR IN THE MDDLE EAST 16 (1969).
88 Id. at 17.
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practiced in World War II. In the present case, the deportations were
to a country of friends and relatives, as an alternative to detention.
The Israeli deportations certainly did not offend against the purport
of Article 49.
The reports also complain of some internal transfers of popula-
tion within the occupied areas. Whatever is the truth of this, it
should be noted that Article 49 authorizes such actions "if the
security of the population or imperative military reasons so de-
mand." 9 If they are voluntary, of course, they do not come within
the terms of this article.
Regarding property abandoned by Arabs in the occupied areas,
the Special Working Group could do nothing other than admit that
Israel had taken steps to protect it,90 citing certain legislation enacted
for this purpose.9
In dealing with the main heads of complaint above, it has been
assumed that Geneva Convention IV, 1949, applies to the occupied
areas. Actually, Israel has not conceded that this convention applies
to those parts of the occupied territories which were formerly ad-
ministered by the mandatory government of Britain. The reason for
this is that Article 2 of the convention states: "The Convention shall
... apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of
a High Contracting Party .... . 92 Egypt and Jordan were both parties
to the convention, as was Israel, but Israel denies that the West Bank
belonged to Jordan or the Gaza Strip to Egypt at the time of the
occupation.93
The International Committee of the Red Cross urged on Israel
that the convention was applicable to the territories. To this, the
Israeli government declared "that it wished 'to leave open for the
time being' the question of the application of the fourth Geneva
Convention, preferring to act on an ad hoc basis by granting practi-
89 Geneva Convention IV, at art. 49.
90 Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 14, E/CN.4/1016/Add. 2, at
3 (1970) (conclusion 1(j)).
91 Id., E/CN.4/1016/Add. 3, at 43-52 1970).
92 Geneva Convention IV, at art. 2. The view of the International Committee
of the Red Cross is that this paragraph was only meant to provide for application of
the convention in "cases where the occupation has taken place without a declaration
of war and without hostilities," J. PICTET, IV COMMENTARY 18-22, and would, there-
fore, not prevent the application of the convention to occupation resulting from the
June war of 1967, which was an "armed conflict" within the meaning of Article 2.
93 For a statement of the legal reasoning on this, see Blum, The Missing Rever-
sioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L. REV. No. 2, at
279-301 (April, 1968). See also Y. BLUM Scu.E BOUNDARIES AND MIDDLE EAST
PEACE 80-91 (1971); J. STONE, No PEAcE--No WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 38-40
(1969). The Special Working Group denies Israel's contention. See Report of the
Special Working Group, supra note 14, E/CN.4/1016, at 13-14 (1970).
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cal facilities to the ICRC delegates."94 Thus, in practice, Israel has
applied the convention.
Israel's stand on the interpretation of the second paragraph of
Article 2 of the convention is, therefore, not a denial that the
humanitarian safeguards of the convention are applicable to her
occupation, but an unwillingness to give any color of legitimacy to
Jordanian or Egyptian title to those territories. However, in regard
to the Golan Heights and Sinai, although some doubts have been
expressed as to the legal status of those territories,9" there can be little
doubt, from any viewpoint, that Geneva Convention IV is applicable
to them. However, since these territories are largely uninhabited,
there is little scope for application of the convention.
Before leaving the subject of the complaints made in the reports,
some attention should be devoted to some highly debatable claims
made by the Special Committee as to international law on the right
of the local inhabitants to self-determination and rights accruing from
conquest in war. 6
THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY
The law of war, which unmistakenly governs the relationship
between Israel and the occupied areas, makes no reference to any
right of self-determination in occupied territory. The rights it deals
with in regard to title to territory are those of states-the dis-
possessed legitimate owner and the de facto ruler, the occupant. The
legitimate sovereign of the territory may be far from representative
of the public will, as is demonstrated in many Arab states.
The dissolution of the colonial empires after World War II
produced a spate of statements on the right of self-determination that
has continued to the present time. Yet many of the newly emerged
states and Communist powers who acclaim such resolutions in the
United Nations are totally unwilling to concede such a right within
their own borders. The truth is that the purported right of self-
determination is an exceedingly vague and undefined concept.
The Special Committee refers to self-determination as a human
right,"'a but it is not listed in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948."7 Some legal opinion doubts that such a right exists
94 Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 14, E/CN.4/1016, at 12(1970) citing from INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS No. 95, at 88 (Feb. 1969). See also
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 1969, at 49-50 (1970).
95 Y. BLUM, SECURE BOUNDARIES AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE 86 n.175a (1971)96 Report of the Special Committee II, at 28(f), 57.
96a Id. at 28(f).
97 See note 45, supra.
[Vol. 12
ISRAEL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
in law at all.98 The Charter of the United Nations calls it a "prin-
ciple" (Article 1(2)), which would make it more of an aspiration
than a right. In the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1966,11 which is still not in force because of insufficient
ratifications, it is referred to as a right (Article 1 (1)); in the United
Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, 1970,100 it is
referred to mostly as a principle, but also as a right.
As a principle, it may constitute the foundation for creating a
right, but not necessarily constitute as such an actual right. In any
case, for a right to have legal validity, it must be translatable into
the circumstances in which it is applicable. A right that is so vague
that is cannot be applied with any degree of definition can hardly
be termed a right.l° a
It cannot be said that the circumstances in which a right of
self-determination may accrue are at all clear, except perhaps in
ousting imposed foreign rule over a homogeneous people in a defined
territory that is not the subject of claims by other peoples. First,
it will be noted that self-determination is a right that belongs to
"peoples," as the instruments cited above have stated. What, then,
is a "people?" Does a population of diverse ethnic origin constitute
a people? Is a collection of different tribes in a territory arbitrarily
carved out by a colonial power a people, merely because they are, or
were, all ruled by the same colonial power? In other words, are the
inhabitants of a state such as Nigeria a people with a right of self-
determination, or is the right confined to a more homogeneous group-
ing such as the Ibos of Biafra in that state? If the latter, there would
be few states in the world, new or old, that would meet the standard
of such a definition. Further, how numerous must a "people" be
before it can claim self-determination? Can a majority population
claim such a right against the wishes of a minority? Does the size of
the majority make a difference?
Then there is the question of "territory." How large must a
territory be before the people in it can claim a right of self-determina-
tion? Can a city, or part of a city, have such a right? How long must
98 Green, Self-Determination and Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 65 Am.
J. INT'L L. No. 4, at 48 (Sept. 1971).
99 G. A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);
cf. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), adopted by G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
100 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
00a Cf., Henri Meyrowitz, LE PRrNCIPE DE L'RCALITE DES BELLIGLRANTS DEVANT
LE DROIT DE LA GuERR 243-244 (1970), "une 'rfgle' ou un 'principe' qui ne sont pas
praticable ne peuvent pr6tendre a la qualit6 de rigle de droit."
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a people inhabit a territory to qualify for self-determination (not
only Jews, but many Arabs are immigrants to Palestine1°1) ? Can a
claim to self-determination be allowed if it would destroy the claim
of another people to self-determination? How must competing claims
be decided? Can people divorced from a territory have a claim to
self-determination within it?
Finally, what does the very word "self-determination" imply?
Is it merely freedom from unwelcome foreign rule, or does it go
deeper and pertain to a right to a democratic form of government?
Can there be self-determination through the agency of a dictator-
ship? In other words, how must the will to self-determination be ex-
pressed and continue to be expressed?
In the light of the foregoing, it will be seen that not only is
the right to self-determination exceedingly ill-defined, but its appli-
cation in the occupied territories to the uneasy amalgam of Moslems
and Christians spread over the Middle East, that the Special Com-
mittee describes as "the Palestinian people,"' °2 is by no means as
clear-cut as the committee assumes.
THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST IN WAR
The question of self-determination in the occupied territories
is also complicated by the issue of the right of conquest in war. On
this, the committee takes its stand on the statement in the preamble
to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which
is the resolution setting out the Security Council's guidelines for
settling the Arab-Israel dispute. The preamble "emphasiz[es] the
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." Apparently,
the committee takes this as a blanket denial of acquisition of terri-
tory in any war. Such an interpretation does not agree with the terms
of the resolution itself, which, in stating the two principles on which
peace should be based: (1) asks for Israeli withdrawal "from terri-
tories occupied," not the territories occupied and; (2) recognizes the
right of Israel, along with the other states in the area, to "secure and
recognized boundaries."'03 As stated earlier in this paper, this indi-
cates that under the terms of the resolution territory may be acquired
in war.
The law of war has always provided for the right of conquest
in war.104 The concept of the illegality of wars of aggression that
101 "It has been estimated that by 1939 one-third of the Arab populace were
newcomers." A. ECKARDT & R. ECKARDT, ENCOUNTER WITH ISRAEL 174 (1970).
102 Report of the Special Committee II, at 55.
10 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 482-83 (1968).
104 M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 600-03 (1959).
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has developed in the past half-century does not, however, permit
acquisition of territory conquered by means of aggression. On the
other hand, it would be completely illogical to protect an aggressor
from forfeiture of territory that he has lost in perpetrating a war of
aggression. That must be one of the sanctions to deter an aggressor
from his course. Otherwise, he would be assured against risk.
The practice of states conforms to this view. Soviet Russia, in
particular, dispossessed Germany and Japan of vast territories after
World War II and, indeed, swallowed other great territories such as
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia with even less excuse.
Israel in 1967 was the subject of "the threat or use of force
against [its] territorial integrity or political independence," in the
words of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. Any rational
interpretation of those events can only lead to the conclusion that
Israel was the victim of an armed aggression, to which, according
to its critics, it should willingly have offered its throat. The fact that
Israel outmaneuvered its assailants is now history, and all the vitu-
peration of Soviet Russia and the Arabs cannot alter that fact.
Certainly under international law, Israel is entitled to have recourse
in these circumstances to the law of conquest to protect itself for the
future.105
PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS
It is evident from the foregoing analysis that the efforts of the
two investigatory bodies to impugn Israel's administration of the
occupied territories lack validity and are politically motivated. The
author's personal, first-hand account of the circumstances surround-
ing Israel's administration of the occupied territories will serve at
this point to round out the picture.
The author and his wife were two of more than half-a-million
people who visited Israel and the occupied territories during 1971."06
More than 100,000 of these visitors were Arabs, who came from as
far away as Kuwait to visit relatives and friends. 7 In a real sense,
Israel and the occupied areas are under the scrutiny of the world;
the society is an open one that does not fear for unfriendly eyes
and ears or what anyone might discover regarding human rights.
The purpose of the author's visit was to participate at Tel Aviv
University in the Symposium on Human Rights, which was organized
1o5 For a discussion of the right of self-determination in relation to the law of
conquest, see Greenspan, The Protection of Human Rights in Time of Warfare, in 1
ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HU MAN RIGHTS 241-245 (1971).
106 The Jerusalem Post, Oct. 6, 1971, at 2, col. 4 (Weekly Overseas Ed.).
107 U.N. Doc. A/8472, at 3 (Oct. 15, 1971).
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in conjunction with the first issue of the Israel Yearbook on Human
Rights."°8 The meeting was held in the first days of July of 1971
and included two days of field trips in the occupied areas. Discussion
was centered on "Human Rights in Time of War" and "Group(Minority) Rights." The participants were experts in human rights
from a variety of countries.
The Chief Justice of the Israel Supreme Court and the Minister
of Justice of Israel opened the sessions, and papers were delivered
by the Attorney General, the general responsible for military adminis-
tration of the occupied territories, the Military Advocate General,
and his senior staff officer. It was evident that there was keen interest
in the issue of human rights in the territories on the part of those
who have the duty of enforcing them there.
Our field trips took us to the bridge spanning the Jordan at
Jericho, where we observed the "open bridges" policy of Israel
in operation, that is, Arab men, women, and children coming over
from Jordan to visit in Israel; to an Arab refugee camp in Bethle-
hem, which constituted a sort of village of fairly substantial accom-
modation; to the courts and Arab judges of the West Bank at
Ramallah; to a former Jordanian Minister of Refugees at Bethle-
hem, and to Hebron, where we met the Arab mayor and the notables
of the area.
In open session before the news media and in private conversa-
tion, we addressed any questions we wished to these personalities
and to others whom we met. In no case did they reflect adversely on
the conduct of the occupation, although they were given every op-
portunity to do so. They said frankly that they did not like being
under occupation, but that if they had to live under occupation then
they preferred this one. The headman of the refugee camp told the
author that the people of the camp worked not only in Jerusalem,
but as far afield as Tel Aviv. I learned that many of these workers
preferred to live in the camp because they paid no rent and received
food rations from the United Nations Relief and Works Administra-
tion. Some of the dwellings were very well furnished. The Mayor
of Hebron assured us that the economic situation of his area was
good.
My wife and I spent a month in Israel and visited the Old City
in Jerusalem on a number of occasions. We saw streams of Christian
pilgrims on the Via Dolorosa, Moslems in the Mosque of Omar and
El Aksa, and Jews at the Western (Wailing) Wall. Clearly, freedom
of worship was respected and guaranteed to every religion, and the
various shrines were maintained and protected.
1o8 See 1 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1971).
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During the last two weeks of our stay, we lived in an Arab hotel
in East Jerusalem. We saw no trace of coercion among the Arab pop-
ulation, no tension, no Israeli troops in the Arab quarter, and only
occasional Arab police. We walked about freely late at night in com-
plete security. In a street at the back of the hotel was an employment
office, set up by Israel for the Arab population. People went about
their business in a normal way and lived normal lives.
On one trip, we traveled along the West Bank through the
occupied areas by regular Israeli bus service, picking up and dropping
off Arab passengers. The atmosphere was friendly along the way and
we saw very few members of the Israeli military.
At our Arab hotel in Jerusalem, we found that we were neigh-
bors of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Early on our
first morning, we were awakened by a crowd that gathered outside.
The people were there to visit Arabs under detention and were taken
in Red Cross buses. We met and spoke to some of the ICRC dele-
gates, including the chief delegate, Mr. Guy Deluz, of Switzerland.
The author asked him for his general opinion of the Israeli occupa-
tion, and his considered reply was that it was "rather decent."
Mr. Deluz had three complaints. First, he wanted Israel to
recognize formally that she was bound by Geneva Convention IV in
relation to the occupation, although he stated that "pragmatically"
Israel observed the convention. Secondly, he said he was not allowed
to see prisoners for about a month after their detention, but that
otherwise he was allowed full access to all prisoners and to interview
them in private. The author later had an opportunity to mention this
matter to the Attorney General, Mr. Meir Shamgar; he replied that
the period was more nearly two weeks, and that the reasons for this
were security and the need to allow time for the prisoners to settle
down in detention.
It should be noted that Article 5 of Geneva Convention IV
permits this procedure by an occupant in the case of security offenses.
"[S]uch person shall, in those cases where absolute military security
so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication
under the present Convention." Articles 30 and 142 also limit access
by aid societies in case of security considerations, "or to meet any
other reaonable need" (Article 142). Thirdly, the chief delegate said
there was some overcrowding in the prisons, but that he understood
Israel's difficulties in that regard and that new accommodations were
being built. The author observed on a visit to Ramleh Prison that
one of the sleeping areas was rather crowded, but it certainly was not
excessive.
With the foregoing personal account may be contrasted the
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distortions and not so subtle hints that the Special Committe has
used to convey the impression that the ICRC agrees with the com-
mittee's charges regarding the occupation." 9 (Even so, in its second
report the committee displays obvious irritation with the ICRC for
refusing to commit itself to the committee's position.) 1 °
A further example of the Special Committee's tendentiousness is
its observation in its second report that "general prison conditions
...are stated to be bad.""' On July 25, 1971, the author visited
both the men's prison at Ramleh and the women's prison nearby. The
women's prison was exceptionally clean, bright, and spacious. The
men's prison was a much older building that the British had built;
yet, it was well maintained and the prisoners were accorded every
reasonable facility, including the chance to learn various trades, such
as shoemaking and printing. There were recreational facilities, cheer-
ful messrooms, and a good hospital.
The author spoke freely with a number of prisoners, male and
female, detained for terrorist activities; and all of them, with one
exception, said that they were receiving humane treatment and decent
food. The one exception was the complaint of two young women
prisoners that they had received rough treatment on a particular
occasion. On this matter, the prison authorities stated that these
prisoners had engaged in riot and arson on that particular occasion,
and guards had to be brought in to restrain them. The two women
were serving sentences for bombing a supermarket, and the bombing
had resulted in deaths. Certainly, the demeanor of the prisoners we
saw showed no evidence of their being coerced or cowed.
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
It is my considered view, from everything I have seen and
learned, that the Israeli occupation is humane and benevolent, and
that it compares exceedingly well with any occupation in history.
A characteristic example of Israel's practise of humanity is her re-
fusal to employ the death penalty, although Article 68 of Geneva
Convention IV authorizes its use for espionage, serious acts of
sabotage against military installations, and intentional offenses caus-
ing death, provided the law of the territory before the occupation
allowed for the death penalty in such cases. Pre-existing law in the
occupied territories permitted imposition of the death penalty. Under
Israeli rule even a terrorist who commits wholesale murder, as has
109 Report of the Special Committee I, at 21-22, 55; Report of the Special Com-
mittee II, at 55.
110 Report of the Special Committee II, at 20-22.
111 Id. at 55.
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happened, is assured that imprisonment is the most he will suffer on
conviction. With this may be contrasted the system of justice in the
Arab states. Jordan employs the death penalty against the same
fedayeen that Israel spares; Syria and Egypt hang espionage agents
in peacetime, Syria doing so in public on occasionl12; Iraq hangs
Jews for being Jews, as part of a public exhibition." 3
As for the standards in Israeli military courts, "The rules of
procedure and evidence in the military courts are the same as those
in the civil courts of Israel. Furthermore, an accused is entitled to
legal representation. If found guilty, he may apply to the regional
military governor, at any time after sentence is passed, for mitiga-
tion of his sentence."" 4
The benevolence of the Israeli administration is further attested
by the vast improvement in the general condition of the population
from what it was before the occupation. Economically and socially,
this population has made great strides, some of which are described
as follows:
[A] great deal has been done to better and modernise the agriculture
of the West Bank .... Total farm production went from 135 million
Israeli pounds to 180 millions pounds in one year, and exports multi-
plied tenfold ... 3.5 million trees were planted in the West Bank-as
many as in all the past fifty years. In 1968, the tobacco crop there was
tripled. In that year, too, industrial productivity went up 54%, thanks,
largely, to loans and other aid from Israel. The budget for education
has gone up by 20 percent." 5
In addition, some 40,000 Arab workers cross into Israel every day
and work alongside Jews for the same wages. "[0] ften ... they earn
three or four times their previous pay-if, indeed, they had been
lucky enough, then, to be employed at all. They have not been slow,
either, to avail themselves of Israeli methods or of the institutions of
labour unions."' 6
The poorest and most backward area at the time of the occupa-
tion was the Gaza Strip. Regarding this:
The policy of this administration was defined as the restoration of nor-
mal conditions of life and security for all the people of the Strip, and
to provide for their economic and social development. As far as pos-
sible, it was conducted through the existing local authorities, with the
112 B. DAN, THE SPY FROM ISRAEL 1(f) (1969).
113 TIME, Feb. 7, 1969, at 22; 17 KEESINC'S, CONT.MPORARY ARcHIVEs 23231A-
32 (1969-70).
114 ISRAEL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE LAW IN ADMINISTERED AREAS 9 (n.d.).
115 Israel Policy Statements, supra note 37, at 6.
116 Id. See also A. ECXARDT & R. ECKARDT, ENCOUNTER WITH ISRAEL 187 (1970);
Lambert, West Bank Gains Under Israel Rule, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 21, 1971, at
12, col. I (Sec. A).
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Israeli element remaining small in numbers and unobtrusive. Large
sums of money were budgeted by the Israeli Treasury for the devel-
opment of agriculture, the promotion of industry, the provision of
municipal and health services and the improvement of transport fa-
cilities. As a result the curse of unemployment, which affected nearly
one half of the population in 1966, has now been almost eliminated.
The average daily wage inside the Strip, which was the equivalent of
one Israel pound in 1966, has now risen to 6.5 Israel pounds."
7
Tributes by impartial foreign observers as to the humaneness
and benevolence of the Israeli occupation have come from all parts
of the world, but it was in fact a hostile source that produced the
following: "[T]he Israeli military occupation is one of the most
liberal and enlightened military occupations in history."" 8
117 Statement by Israel Ambassador Mordecai Kidron on Agenda Item No. 5 of
the 27th Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 12 March 1971.
See also A. ECKARDT & R. ECKARDT, ENCOUNTER WITH ISRAEL 181 (1970), cf. Lambert,
Israel Reports Gains in Gaza, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 14, 1971, at 4, cols. 1-2 (Sec.
B).
118 Epp, The Palestinians-A Hi-Jacked People, in 15-6 WORLD FEDERALIST No. 98
Nov.-Dec. 1970, at 7, col. 1, cited in statement by Israel Ambassador Kidron, see id.
